

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

FRENCH SUFFERERS. — If the accounts, with which the French official papers have lately been filled, of the sufferings of the people of France, in consequence of the war, be *true*, which I see no reason to doubt, it appears to me that they are as much the objects of compassion, and have as great a claim upon the charitable benevolence of this country, as the suffering Germans, or any other suffering people on earth. The religion which we profess does not only enjoin it as one of the duties of a Christian, to feed the hungry and clothe the naked of his own particular nation or sect, but it inculcates *universal* benevolence. It does more; it commands us to *love our enemies*; and, in conforming to these precepts, it assures us that we conform to the Father of All, and by him will be rewarded in due time for these virtuous deeds. What other impulse; what other motives than these influence the great mass of the community, who are just now so actively engaged in promoting the subscription for the suffering Germans? Among these I observe the names of the great bulk of the people called Quakers, who utterly disclaim all motives of action in this case but those which arise from the benevolent maxims of the religion which they profess; who say they are actuated by no interested consideration, and who give their money for the relief of the miserable victims of war in Germany, not because these unfortunates have a higher claim upon their purse than others who may be equally unfortunate, but because they hold it to be the duty of all Christians, and, indeed, of all mankind, whatever may be their religion, to contribute towards the amelioration of suffering humanity, whether the call be made by an Englishman or by a German, by a Frenchman or by a Spaniard. These philanthropic principles are what I have often heard avowed by the Quakers, and I have often witnessed them exemplified in the conduct of many a worthy member of that association. — I should hope they are not confined to the narrow circle of my observation. I should hope that it is not with

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a *profession* of philanthropy merely, that this numerous and respectable body of my fellow-citizens are satisfied. I trust it is not a *few* of them who are alive to the misery and wretchedness of their fellow-men, but that they *all* feel alike on this subject, and are *all* employed, as far as they have the means, in administering the comforts of life to those who are in want of them. I say, I hope and trust this is the case. But, I do confess, I have my fears upon the subject. I entertain strong doubts that their present interference in behalf of the Germans, is not altogether so disinterested as they would have the world believe. Have they no wish, no desire, in this age of *universal patriotism*; when the cry of *general liberty* and the *emancipation of Europe* is in every one's mouth, to appear as patriotic as their neighbours? At least, does not the *very active* part which they have taken in raising money for *our Allies*, show that they do not wish, in this *loyal* age, to be suspected of incivism? I may be mistaken; but when I look into the history of the Quakers, I am very apt to think that their present *decided* conduct is somewhat tinged with the feeling which I have mentioned. Still I admit I may be wrong in my conjecture. The moment, however, is arrived, which must remove all doubt on this head; which must serve as a *touchstone* to try the *sincerity* not only of this extensive class of religious professors, but of innumerable other classes, all over the country, who boast, as much as the Quakers do, of their *universal benevolence*, and who point to their names in the subscription list for the suffering Germans, as proofs of their philanthropy. The hour, I say, is come, which must either confirm the claim of these numerous sects to the genuine character of Christians, such as they themselves describe it to be, or entirely overthrow all their pretensions. The people of France are now afflicted with all the horrors of war under which the neighbouring states and kingdoms so recently groaned, and which excited the commiseration of this country in their behalf. To so great a height, indeed, have these suffer-

ings arisen, that they have attracted the particular notice of the Municipality of Paris, who have held several public meetings for the purpose of receiving the reports of the Deputies employed to collect information as to the extent of the evil. These reports, says the *Courier*, "which are given at length with the signatures of all the Deputies, in the *Moniteur* and other papers, are *too long*, and *too revolting* to be given entire. They present a series of pictures, which may serve as companions to those of the atrocities of the French themselves in those unhappy countries which have witnessed the retreat of their discomfited armies." It is not my intention to make any remarks upon the important fact here admitted by the *Courier*, that if the French armies committed atrocities in the countries which they lately overrun, these have been since equalled, have since found companions in the interior of France. The fact, indeed, was sufficiently known before, by the proclamation of Marshal Blücher, who found it necessary to threaten his soldiers with military execution on the spot, if they persisted in their depredations upon the inhabitants. What I wish principally to remark upon the above passage is, that the sufferings of the French people are admitted to be at least as great as those of the Germans. The details of them are represented to be extremely "revolting," and the miseries of both nations are aptly described to be fit "companions." But why the extent of these sufferings, and the enormity of the "atrocities" committed, should have been considered a reason for suppressing these details, I cannot discover; unless, indeed, those who have the management of these matters were afraid that a perusal of these revolting accounts, might excite a kindred feeling to that which exists on behalf of the Germans. Every circumstance connected with the sufferings of the latter has been ransacked from all quarters; and, as appears to me, without proper attention to the sources whence the greater part of the information has been drawn, obtruded upon public notice with an unjustifiable degree of anxiety; whereas the details which have been furnished of the great extent of French suffering, and of French misery, on the authority of men officially employed for the purpose of drawing them up, and whose reports have been authenticated by their appearance in the *Moniteur*, are considered *too long* for publication! Of all these numerous and highly important documents, the following is the

only one to which it has been thought prudent to give an English dress; and which, though limited in the information it contains, I have given here, because I consider it calculated to lay a foundation for the exercise of that benevolence, of that general philanthropy, which is so much in vogue in this country.

Report to his Excellency the Minister of the Interior, by M. Desprez Crassier, Auditor to the Council of State, dated March 2, 1814.

"I now lay before you the heart-rending picture of the calamities and outrages which the inhabitants of the communes I have visited have experienced from the enemy. It will be an abstract of the subscribed depositions taken by verbal examination, and an abridged detail of the havoc which I have seen with my own eyes.—That part of the enemy's army which caused all these evils was chiefly composed of Russian troops, a small number of Bavarians and Wurtembergers, and some Hungarian husars.—At Nangis the inhabitants generally had to complain of pillage; their personal outrages leave frightful recollections; pillage itself was always accompanied with menaces, very often with ill-treatment; and it was with pistols at their breasts, and the sabre over their heads, that these brigands compelled the unfortunate inhabitants to declare where their money and valuable effects were concealed.—The 1st and 2d depositions state, that a female received from these miscreants a blow on the loins, with the flat side of their sabre, which deprived her of sense; that they held a knife to the throat of another, to compel her to disclose where her money was; that the two husbands of these women were cruelly struck, and that one of them, after being beaten in his own house, was driven to the enemy's camp, with blows of the fist, and the butt ends of muskets: there the brigands compelled him to strip, and were about to shoot him, when an officer fortunately came up, and delivered him out of the hands of these barbarians.—At the house of the man of landed property, who makes the sixth deposition, they perpetrated the most horrible excesses. With blows of the fist and the butt end of their muskets, they demanded his brandy and money. I myself saw the bloody marks of the blows which he received; but their fury did not stop there; four females from the commune of Bailly, and canton of Mormant, had taken refuge with this proprietor; two of

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them were girls from 12 to 13: the others were women from 28 to 35. These unfortunate creatures were the *victims of the brutality* of these ferocious men; and an eye-witness, who wished to prevent their outrages, was himself severely *beaten*.—[The report, after describing a variety of *similar outrages on the persons of individuals*, proceeds as follows:]—There is not a farmer, an innkeeper, or an inhabitant, who has not seen his *cattle, his implements of agriculture, his property, his furniture, carried off, wasted, or burnt*. The churches and ministers of religion have not been spared more than others.—*The strongest language would fail in describing the mournful aspect which these ravaged habitations present*. The Secretary of the Mayor of Rampillon, who has been a soldier, declared to me, that he never saw troops deliver themselves up to pillage with such *horrible rage, even when licensed so to do*.—At Nangis I visited a number of farm-houses, which had been previously well furnished; but now in all the apartments nothing was to be seen but *fragments of broken and half-burnt furniture, feather-beds and mattresses torn to pieces, and the feathers and wool scattered about*. It was with the wood-work of this furniture, of waggons and ploughs, and with the fruit-trees of orchards and gardens, that they lighted their fires at their bivouacs, and roasted the cattle which they had carried off and killed.—In all the places I have passed through, the inhabitants have declared that these banditti spoke only of pillaging and burning Paris. I have been assured that each of them had a torch slung at his back; and when asked what use they meant to make of it, they universally answered, that it was to set fire to Paris, where they calculated on arriving by the 18th of February. This fact was confirmed to me by M. Grabwisky, Mayor of Mormant, a Pole by birth, who understood their language.—The picture of the calamities which these unfortunate people have suffered, and which are reserved for all those of the other departments into which the enemy may penetrate, must rouse the indignation of all Frenchmen, and give them the courage and energy necessary to repel those hordes of barbarians beyond the frontiers, and force them, by a peace glorious for France, at last to give repose to all Europe."

Whether the calamities, the misery, the wretchedness, which is depicted in the preceding narrative, are justifiable or not accord-

ing to the system of warfare now introduced into *civilized Europe*, is a point entirely foreign to my present purpose, and which can in no shape affect the question, whether the French people, who are *confessedly as great sufferers* by the war as the Germans, have not the same claims as the latter upon our Christian charity. All that is generally required to induce an exercise of this benevolence, is the making out of a case; is a statement of facts sufficient to remove all doubts as to the persons being *proper objects* of our compassion. Here then, ye professors of a religion, characterized by the purest system of morality established amongst men, is a case made out to your satisfaction, which even the most inveterate political enemies of France have not dared to question. Here are objects upon which to exercise that charity which you so much extol, because its operation is not confined to any particular time, people, place, or circumstances; because it embraces the whole human race in its benign circle; and because it is only necessary to give a nation or individuals a claim upon your bounty, that they are suffering distress. Here you have a picture of the "heart-rending calamities" of a people who have been deprived of every thing they possessed on earth, even of their habitations during a long and dreary winter, by the rude hand of ferocious war. Here you have the young and the old, the infirm as well as the healthy, the matron and the virgin, imploring relief from the hands of those who are far removed from this dreadful scourge, and who have it in their power to give them that relief. Where then, ye philanthropic Dissenters; where, ye pious and charitable Churchmen, are your bowels of compassion for suffering humanity? If you do not step forward immediately and afford relief as liberally to the French sufferers, whose case is so powerfully recommended to your notice, as what you have done to their neighbours the Germans, you will belie all your professions of universal benevolence; you will fully justify the suspicion, that you are actuated by motives very different indeed from those which your religion inculcates. In short, if, after the appeal which is now made to your humanity in behalf of the French people, you should nevertheless turn a deaf ear to that call, it will no longer remain a doubt, that the part which you have taken as to the German sufferers, is altogether *political*; that you have been impelled to this from the mere selfish consideration of

wishing not to be behind in demonstrating your *loyalty* at a moment when so much stress is laid upon this mode of showing one's patriotism. You may by such conduct escape the charge of *jacobinism*, if this be your object; but it never can procure you the respect of the virtuous, nor satisfy your own minds, that you are acting a consistent part; whereas, by extending your benevolence to *all*; by relieving the distresses even of your *enemies*, (supposing you consider the *people* of France in that light) you insure the applause of all good men, and the approbation of your own consciences. Those who object to giving money for the relief of the sufferers in France, for no other reason than that we are at war with that country, are to be looked upon as *mere politicians*, who have no pretensions to Christian benevolence, and who, of course, cannot be moved by any of the foregoing remarks. These cold-blooded, these flinty, these steel-hearted mortals, would do well to recollect, that though we are at war with the French *government*, that it is not in behalf of any of its members, nor even of its wounded soldiers, that we are called upon to interest ourselves. It is in behalf of the suffering *inhabitants*, who, it is clear, take no part in the war; it is in behalf of the aged and the infirm; it is in behalf of the youth of both sexes; it is in behalf of the farmer and the artisan, who were pursuing their lawful occupations in the bosom of peace, and who, till lately, were remote from the din and horrors of war, that the appeal is made. Like the inhabitants of Germany, who were following similar pursuits, they have been suddenly and unexpectedly deprived of comfort and ease, and thrown upon the wide world to seek even the bare means of subsistence. Like the Germans, therefore, they have an undoubted claim upon our humanity. Besides, if it be true, as these *natural enemies* of France tell us, that the people there are groaning under a disgraceful and despotic tyranny; that they are the *unwilling* instruments in the hands of an arbitrary government, of perpetuating the scourges of war; that they are at all times liable to be dragged from their homes, to fill up the ranks of the armies of the man, who thus lords it over them, and who can check and restrain every disposition towards emancipation, by the powerful military force which he always has at his command. If, I say, this is a *true* picture of the situation of the people of France, how can those men, who give us these representations, and who vouch for their accuracy,

blame the *inhabitants* of that country, for being at war with us? or why ought they to be punished, by being left to starve, on account of the misdeeds of their government? To me, it appears, quite clear that, instead of this deplorable and *helpless* condition, affording a reason for visiting them with *additional* calamities, they are entitled on that account alone, to more commiseration than the Germans, who, we are positively assured, have enjoyed the most *perfect liberty* ever since the French were driven out of their country. It is entirely fallacious then to refuse pecuniary aid to the *peaceable* inhabitants of France, who are suffering the horrors of war in an equal degree with, if not in a greater, than their neighbours, *merely* because the French government chooses to continue hostilities. Indeed, if there is any thing at all in the argument, it applies with equal force to the Germans as to the French; for are not both their governments prosecuting the war with the same resolute determination? and are not the miseries which at present overwhelm so large a portion of continental Europe, the result, (as stated by the *Courier*) of the ravages of the soldiers of *both* the opposing armies? Away then with those hypocritical pretensions, with those senseless clamours about benevolence, philanthropy, and Christian charity, which are founded on so unhallowed a base. He only is the true philanthropist, who extends his arm to succour distress wherever it appears, whether the object of it be a Turk or a Pagan, a Jew or a Christian, a worshipper of Bramah, or an adorer of the terrible Odin. He only can be called benevolent, who seeks out the victim of misfortune, regardless of peace or war, and raises him from the dust, whatever may be his place of residence.

WAR OF EXTERMINATION.

MR. COBBETT.—The strength, clearness, and accuracy of your reasoning, whether your discussions relate to political or religious topics, cannot but procure you many admirers among your numerous readers. But much as I am disposed to concur in this general sentiment, and much as I am inclined to subscribe to the greater part of your opinions, there are some particulars in which I find I cannot bring myself exactly to your way of thinking; some points as to which you appear to me to have reasoned wrong, and to which, I am rather afraid, you have not given that attention which their great importance demands. One of

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these topics is that which I have chosen for the title of this letter, and upon which, I observe, you made some very pertinent remarks in reference to Bonaparte in your last Register. In so far as you there endeavoured to hold up to public execration the crime of assassination, you fully met my views; but, when you seemed to recommend a termination of the war with such a people as the French, and to advise us to enter into treaties with them, and acknowledge them as brethren, I found I could not go any farther with you in opinion. I found, on an examination of these arguments, that they were contrary to the ideas almost universally entertained in this country; and, if adopted, that they might prove fatal to our religious and political establishments. But what was of still greater importance, I discovered that it would be a direct violation of an express law of God to follow up your recommendation. In short, it is evident to me, that the *extermination of the French nation* is absolutely essential to the security of Great Britain, and its expediency clearly demonstrable from reason and from scripture. You, Mr. Cobbett, need not be told, that God selected the Jews of old for the purpose of clearing the earth of idolators, and putting them, his chosen people, in possession of "a land flowing with milk and honey," In conformity to this example, it is incumbent on all godly nations to wage war against the *impious*, the *sacrilegious*, and the *ungodly*: but it is particularly incumbent on this *our* nation, as being by far the *most godly* nation on the face of the globe. For the truth of this assertion, I appeal to all our controversialists for almost 200 years back, who have boldly affirmed, and, I think, fully proved, that as of all forms of religion, Christianity is the most godly, so, of all modes of Christianity, that professed by the Church of England is the purest and most orthodox.—A nation, then, *professing* and *practising* this orthodox and pure religion, may well be denominated the people of God: consequently this people ought to exterminate all God's enemies. When the Amalekites, who vainly endeavoured to oppose the entrance of the children of Israel into the land of promise, were discomfited by Joshua (as is related in the 17th chapter of Exodus), "the Lord said to Moses, write this for a memorial in a book, and rehearse it in the ears of Joshua, *for I will utterly put out the remembrance of Amalek from under heaven.* And Moses built an altar,

"and called the name of it Jehovah-Nissi: "for he said, *Because the Lord hath sworn, that the Lord will have war with Amalek from generation to generation.*" Now, what are the French people but a race of Amalekites, who have, in a great measure, renounced Christianity, and who bend the knee to the *God of nature*, and to that idol monster called *human reason*? That the French have, in a great measure, renounced Christianity, is clear from their having abolished its *political* establishments, and left it to struggle the best it can for its own existence. No revenues, no emoluments, no provision made by the state for its ministers! no respect paid to its temples, no regard to its festivals, no veneration for its rites and ceremonies! What is there sacred in religion which they have not profaned? Chalices, candlesticks, crucifixes, pixes, ostensories, images, shrines, and reliquaries; all have been converted into current coin! Baptized bells have been transformed into cannon bullets, and consecrated churches to armories and arsenals! Their bishops they have banished; their priests they have persecuted; their whole hierarchy they have overturned! They have even sacrilegiously dared to turn the Holy Father (God's vicar on earth) out of the Papal chair, and to detain him in woeful captivity.—I know that some well-meaning Protestants think, that, in all this, the French did little harm; or, rather, that they did much good. It was (say they) only overturning the throne of Anti-Christ, abolishing an idolatrous and blasphemous worship, destroying an *overgrown body of superstition* (as Addison somewhere calls it), and clearing away the nasty filth with which the *scarlet whore* and her paramour had polluted the house of God. Such reflections I have heard made by Protestants, and even by some of the established clergy. But these, I presume, were Protestants of the *old school*; disciples of Stillingfleet, Tillotson, Newton, and Hurd. Our modern divines, however, teach them a more orthodox, certainly a more charitable doctrine. They teach them that the Roman Catholics are our *dear brethren* in Christ; that their bishops and priests are confessors and *martyrs* for the true faith; that destroying their supposed implements of idolatry was *sacrilege*; and that robbing them of their revenues, was *impiety*: and so think I.—The French, then, being an impious, sacrilegious, ungodly nation, a set of real Amalekites, and we the chosen people of God, it is plain that we ought to "have

"war with Amalek from generation to generation." It will be said, perhaps, or at least thought, that this conclusion is rashly drawn. But, I hope I shall be able to make the contrary appear. The objection, taken in its full force, seems to be the following:—"Granting that we are now the chosen people of God, as much as the Israelites were of old, and that the French are as hostile to God and us as the Amalekites were of old to God and the Israelites, it doth not follow that we have a right to wage a continual war against them, unless we have a special commission from heaven so to do. To us the Lord hath not sworn that the Lord will have war with the French, from generation to generation." Nor has he declared it to be his will, that "the remembrance of France should be utterly put out from under heaven." This may be the wish of the war faction, but it is not so clear that it is the will of God.—I answer: To me it is perfectly clear; for, let me ask, how the will of God is manifested to any nation but through the medium of its government, especially in the case of making peace or war? Indeed, I can see no good reason why a nation should go to war at all, if they do not consider the will of the sovereign the will of heaven itself. When our gallant troops were ordered across the seas to subdue the Americans, did they hesitate a moment to march, from the reflection that they were going to carry on an *unjust* war against the will of heaven? No; they embarked in the implied idea that they were doing their duty; and the will of government to them was the will of God. Again, When government said to Marquis Wellington, "Choose men; go out; fight with the French;" the noble Marquis paid the same obedience to that order: and our brave armies followed him, in the supposition that he was executing the will of God, by executing the will of his Majesty's ministers, the vice-gerent of God's vice-gerent. This is a doctrine that cannot be too often and too deeply inculcated on the minds of subjects; it is the base of all subordination, from the King's servants down to my servants. According to the Apostle Paul, every common servant is to consider the will of his master, every common master, as the will of God himself. How much more are not subjects, then, obliged to consider the will of the supreme magistrate as the will of the Supreme Being?—But the will of heaven, with respect to warring against the French, has been sufficiently expressed,

not only by the voice of government, but by the voice of the people (which, to a proverb, is the voice of God) through their representatives in parliament, and by the whole bench of Bishops. It is beyond question, then, that whenever government engage in a war, and when that war is sanctioned by the national representatives, it is the will of heaven that it should be carried on, and carried on until its object be attained. If it be asked, what this object at present is? I answer, that it must be the total extirpation of the French nation: putting out the remembrance of Amalek from under heaven!—It has been said, that the object of the war with France is to replace a Bourbon king on the throne; but this cannot be true: for when the nation had a king of that race, they were just as hostile to us as they are at present; perhaps more so: and if they had a king of that race to-morrow, they would not cease to be as hostile to us as before. In a word, with respect to us, they would be still down-right Amalekites: for these, too, had their kings, the last of whom Samuel hewed in pieces before the Lord at Gilgal.—But it has been hinted, that we are at war with France on account of French *principles* propagated in the code Napoleon, and that we must continue this war as long as these principles are cherished and avowed in France, lest, peradventure, they should cross the channel, and debauch the minds and morality of God's people on this side the water. This, I allow, has a plausible appearance; and I am inclined to think that it may be one, although not the only or principal reason, for persevering in the war with France. The order which God gave, by the hand of Moses to exterminate the Canaanites, was given, partly, to prevent them from contaminating the minds and manners of the Israelites, by their heterodox doctrines and corrupt morality. And although the same charge is not explicitly brought against the Amalekites, we may believe that their faith and their practices were not so much better than those of the Canaanites; and therefore we may reasonably suppose, that this was at least *one* cause for God's swearing eternal war with them. But still the great and the only ostensible cause was their "coming out to fight with Israel in Rephidim;" or, as it is expressed in the first book of Samuel, "because they laid wait for him (Israel) in the way when he came out of Egypt." On this account, Saul was ordered to "Smite Ama-

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"lek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass;" but the unseasonable commiseration of this milk hearted monarch, led him to disobey this order, which provoked the just resentment of Jehovah against him, who deprived him of his kingdom.—I infer, then (and the inference, I think, is strictly logical), that it was not precisely the bad principles or practices of the Amalekites, which drew down upon them celestial vengeance; but their coming out to fight with God's people in Rephidim, and endeavouring to retard their march into the land of Canaan. From a strict similarity of cases, I must equally infer, that the main cause of our present war with the people of France, is not their principles or practices, but their opposing us in our *march to Paris*.—In fact, if the fear of French principles had been the sole or chief object of the war, it would not have been necessary; it would not even have been expedient, to march our armies into France or Holland; we have only to guard our coasts against their introduction hither, as we do against the introduction of smuggled goods. We might have treated French principles as we treat French liquors: the duties on them might have been made so high, and the penalties so enormous, that they could not have readily been imported; or if imported, could not be within the reach of the *rabble*, who were the most likely to be corrupted by them: whereas, by sending our soldiers, who form a considerable portion of that rabble, into France and Holland, we gave them an opportunity of tasting French *liquors* and French *principles*, and thus relishing both; for French principles and French liquors are equally agreeable to the bulk of mankind, who have not the discernment to distinguish between what is pleasing to the senses and pernicious to the soul, and who perceive not easily the latent poison that is mingled in the delicious draught.—Our offensive war against France, then, had some other object; we wanted to *get possession of the country*, as the Israelites wanted to get possession of the land of Canaan: and I know not but that we had as good a right to the one as they had to the other. We are God's own people as well as they;—in his name, and at his will, we march and move as well as they;—we have a Moses to direct us as well as they;—we have Aarons and Hurs to support his heavy

hands as well as they; we want only a portable *sanctuary*, which may soon be constructed at a much less expense than theirs.—On the other hand, the *iniquity of the French Amalekites* is universally acknowledged to be *full*: their sins, like those of Sodom and Gomorrah, have been long crying to heaven for vengeance; and we are unequivocally called to be the instruments of inflicting it.—We had a right, then, to march our armies into France, in order to take possession of it; and because *Amalek* came out to fight with us in Rephidim, we have an implicit and virtual order from heaven to make war with Amalek until he be utterly destroyed.—Hitherto the parallel has been uniformly and astonishingly just; but there is here at last a dissimilarity, which demands explanation. When the Amalekites came to fight with Israel in Rephidim, *they* were "discomfited:" but when the French came to fight with us *we* were discomfited, and obliged to make a sudden retreat. I think I hear some incredulous scoffer tauntingly say, 'if the people of this country are God's chosen people, how came they to be defeated, and prevented from marching to Paris by these modern Amalekites?'—This, I confess, is a hard question; and, perhaps, the solution I am going to give, may not seem altogether satisfactory. It may be that many of our soldiers, and some of their commanders, had not *sanctified* themselves previously to the engagement.—It may be, that they were *Amalekites* in practice, although *Israelites* in profession. It may be, that the measure of their iniquity, although not quite so full as that of the French, was sufficiently so, to make God abandon them on those occasions, by way of fatherly chastisement, to induce them to repentance and reformation.—Or it may be, that one or more of them have touched "the accursed thing." A rich brocade, or a piece of Brussels' lace, may have tempted some Achan to "put forth his hand, and take them, and hide them in his tent;" and, perhaps, the sin is yet unexpiated!—But, as I am unwilling to throw any degree of blame upon our brave soldiers, I will not urge mere possibilities as causes of the failures we have experienced; but rather charge these failures to the negligence and inattention of those who planned the expeditions. We must not, then, be disheartened by the want of success which has hitherto attended our arms; nor diverted from *marching to Paris*, because we

have been frequently impeded in our career. We have only to avoid our former errors, to supply our former omissions, and to persevere in our heaven-directed attempts. Those who think their losses irreparable, think like dastards. The greater our misadventures have been, the greater reason have we to hope they may be retrieved. Such was the language of Demosthenes to his fellow citizens, when they were trembling for the safety of the state: "Despair not of your affairs, Athenians, although, indeed, they are in a bad plight. What has, for the past, been the most pernicious to you, is the stronger motive of hope for the future! Why? our affairs are in so bad a condition, because we have done precisely what we ought not to have done, and not done what we ought to have done."—In order, then, to insure success in future, we must arm our respectable citizens, an honest yeomanry, and independent gentlemen. These must be headed by bold Barons, Peers, or the sons of Peers; such soldiers as our ancestors sent to *Cressy*, to *Agincourt*, and to *Poitiers*. With these troops ought to be blended no foreign mercenaries, who are sold for money to the best bidder, and who may stand in the field of battle to be knocked on the head, but who would never do honour to the cause in which they might fall. Of all such we must purge our armies. We must renounce every alliance with idolators, infidels, and heretics, if we wish to draw down the blessing of heaven on this holy enterprize. But what is of still greater importance, we must not send our soldiers, however select, however holy, however devout, without being accompanied by our legislators, or at least their representatives: not indeed to fight, but to influence by their presence, and by their prayers. Let it be remembered, that, while Joshua and his chosen army were fighting in the plain, Moses and his companions were praying in the mountains. Let my Lord Liverpool then, as our chief legislator, our Moses, go out with our troops, with the rod of God in his hand; that wonderful magic wand with which he has of late performed more miracles than Moses did in Egypt. Let our Aaron and our Hur accompany him to the summit of some hill, where our hosts may engage the French Amalekites; let them set our Moses on a stone; let him sit thereon, and stretch out his hands to heaven; and when his hands grow heavy, let them be supported by his two associates until the going down

of the sun; and I pledge my existence that the French Amalekites will be discomfited; and that our troops shall march to Paris without further impediment.—Whether, at the time, it will be proper to destroy the whole nation, man, woman, infant, suckling, ox, sheep, camel, ass; or whether, that is to be left to some future period, I will not take upon me to decide: but this I will affirm, that "we must have war with Amalek, from generation to generation, until the remembrance of Amalek be put out under Heaven!" If, even with all the preparation and precautions which I have mentioned, we should not, at first, be successful (which I can hardly doubt), still we may persevere in the contest, and not be dismayed at one, or even more defeats. The war of the other Israelites with the tribe of Benjamin, related in the Book of Judges, was at least as pious and just a war as that in which we are now engaged: and yet the Benjamites routed them twice, and slew 40,000 of their best and chosen men! And it was not until after having consulted the High-priest Phinehas, and using a stratagem to decoy the enemy into a snare laid for them, that they were at length victorious. With these splendid results before our eyes, it is base, it is cowardly, to listen to the senseless clamour for peace which has gone abroad among our fellow citizens. We ought to disregard the murmurs of peevish discontent; to stop our ears against the Siren voice of these who urge the plea of humanity, let them chant it ever so sweetly. We ought to come forward with willing hearts and open hands, and empty our purses into the minister's budget; give full and implicit confidence to one who never once abused our confidence. He has only as yet demanded one tenth of our income: if he should demand a fifth let us give it him: if, in short, he should demand the whole, let us part with it cheerfully; for when he shall have conquered France, and extirpated its inhabitants, great, exceeding great will be our recompense. Then, instead of adulterated bread, we shall eat loaves of the purest wheat; instead of insipid potatoes, we shall eat high flavoured truffles; instead of beef and mutton, we shall feast on red-legged partridges, beccoficos, and ortolans; instead of goose-berries and crab apples, we shall eat grapes and peaches; olives, instead of elder-berries; and oranges instead of hips: instead of pernicious gin, we shall drink generous brandy; and, instead of sharp small beer,

staff the nectar of the Gods! Nothing but want of faith in God and in government can make us forego these great blessings, which we are certain of obtaining if we persevere in the war until "the remembrance of France be put out under heaven."

POLEMOPHILUS.

MAGNANIMITY OF BONAPARTE.

Sir,—In the Morning Chronicle of Feb. 25, is the following article: "The Count de Escars arrived, we are told, on the 8th, at night, at Troyes, the head-quarters of the Allies. The two Counts de Polignac, who, as our readers may remember, were arrested and tried with Moreau, have made their escape from Paris, and are arrived at head quarters."

—The above paragraph, if true, exhibits a trait of the blackest ingratitude; for it is, without doubt, in the remembrance of thousands, the magnanimous conduct of Bonaparte to those two brothers who had forfeited their lives by conspiring with Pichegru, Georges, Moreau, and others, to put to death the saviour of their country. Indeed, some men are so base and depraved, that to do them a service is to make them your enemy for ever after. The following extract from Miss Plumtre's *Tour in France*, vol. 3, will bring the fact to the recollection of your readers, and put to shame (if they have a particle left) the malignant slanderers of the French Emperor.

—"The Counts de Polignac being tried for the conspiracy above alluded to, the elder was found guilty and condemned; the younger was acquitted. The elder was married and had a family, to whom he would have been a great loss; the younger was single. The latter went to Bonaparte and earnestly intreated him to take his life instead of his brother's, stating what a fatal thing to his family it would be, that the head of it should lose his life in such a way; that he being a single man, his life was of no importance to any body. Bonaparte applauding the generous feeling that dictated the request, immediately granted a free pardon to both." If you think this worthy a place in your valuable and useful Register, its insertion will much gratify your constant reader.

2d March, 1814.

T. H.

To the Editor of the Political Register.

Sir—Through the medium of your impartial paper, I shall be very much oblig-

ed, if you will allow the following an insertion, *verbatim*, in your next Register.—I am, &c.

THOMAS MANT.

Southampton, March 7th, 1814.

MR. MANT, AND THE CAPTAINS CAMPBELL AND WILSON.

Mr. Mant begins, in answer to Captain Campbell's statement of the subject in question, which appeared in the Register of the 5th inst. respecting the "illegality of the selling of prizes, &c." and states, he is not at all conscious of having represented, "*in a loose manner, these transactions*," and which term is totally opposite to his meaning, particularly so, as they have so lately been noticed in this Register as requiring a more serious attention; nor does it appear, Captain Campbell is at all sensible of the impropriety of those transactions, as he shows no inclination to defend them, except *loosely* expressing, "there was nothing contrary to the laws and usages in force, &c., as far as they really did take place," yet surely, Captain Campbell cannot forget the nature of the king's order, of the 26th of July, 1806, and the three Orders in Council of the 11th of November, 1807; and those papers previously adverted to, in the Register of the 19th ult. page 229, and in my possession, as being immediately under their influence;—2ndly. Mr. Mant admits he did make the charges to the Admiralty, against Captain Campbell, but observes, *not* before he had represented Mr. Mant's conduct *unjustly* to the Transport Board, and that also *privately* and partially, as stated in pages 48 and 49 of his pamphlet, and which Captain Campbell now corroborates; and Mr. Mant, also admits, of the Inquiry that took place, on Captain Campbell's conduct respecting these transactions, and by order of the admiralty; but still it must be recollected, that the result proves only an *ex parte adjudication*, as the admiralty have never called on Mr. Mant, or any other person, publicly, to substantiate, his statements on this head; nor have their Lordships ever been put in possession of such documents, as could sufficiently authorize impartially, the opinion, that Captain Campbell thinks so satisfactory, their lordships having twice refused Mr. Mant an interview for that purpose; and which are still in his power to bring forward; and by a reference to the pages 54 and 55 of the same pamphlet, the whole of this matter will be found more fully explained.

—3dly. Mr. Mant, in regard to the “commencement of the dispute,” says he has no recollection whatever of preferring charges against Captain Campbell, when abroad, and positively denies the “showing of papers, to several respectable gentlemen at Southampton,” (and this can easily be refuted by his mentioning the names) and but in a very partial manner elsewhere; nor did he ever show papers, or did he ever speak of Captain Campbell in any disrespectful way, prior to Captain Campbell’s writing to the Transport Board, and exposing those papers he circulated against Mr. Mant, in this neighbourhood; and it is certainly most extraordinary, “where Captain Campbell says, he wished of all things to avoid anything like a *controversy* with Mr. Mant,” that he should not recollect, that he was through this channel, regarded as having given the challenge, now strengthened by his last declaration, viz. “of having reported Mr. Mant’s conduct to the Transport Board, previous to the circumstances rendered to the Admiralty of himself,” and further corroborated by the statement of Mr. Mant, in his said pamphlet, page 46, viz. “expressive of his unwillingness to enter into a further controversy with Capt. Campbell, &c. being in some measure satisfied with the justice, that had been rendered his character, by the extract of that letter Captain Campbell sent to Lord Collingwood, as the explanation of the several reports, viz. “to the purport of informing his lordship that, *after a diligent search, &c. he could not find any thing to criminate him;*” and moreover the *perfect acquittal* of the several charges, &c., by the Deputation’s letter to Captain Campbell, with whom the peculation was said to have existed, and both which may be seen at pages 20 and 24 of the said pamphlet.

—4thly. Mr. Mant also observes, that his integrity will not permit him to feel that weight, which Captain Campbell so *piteously commiserates*; as he can with the purest truth say, he never had any idea of the *illegality of the proceedings*, till Captain Campbell, had acquainted him of the calumnious reports, and then at Malta; for on his return to the Adriatic, he was solicited by the deputation to re-commence their negotiations, which he *refused*, and was never informed *his services* would not be required further on his agency, *by any one*; nor did it ever appear to him, that the deputation, after his refusal, &c. ever continued their negotiations, as very soon

after, Mr. Mant refused his assistance to them, the *Pilot, Haire*, entered on the agency, as so particularly described at page 38 of the said pamphlet; and further respecting his “not messing as usual,” he also observes, that Captain Campbell never refused to sit down with him at his mess-table, till *December 16, 1808*, although the charges had been known to Captain Campbell, in the latter part of September, 1807; and this circumstance, of such a considerable time having been suffered to elapse, before the objection was resorted to, surely must in the minds of his readers experience a powerful conviction, that this act did not proceed altogether from the subject of the supposed unfairness in conducting the prize-affairs, but in a great measure owing to the information, Mr. Mant felt himself obligated to render to the officers of the *Unité*, which took place on the 10th of December preceding, respecting the present of 1,500 N. Zeechens sent to Captain Campbell, and which he had received; the statement of which is made at p. 30 (*vide Pamphlet*); and for which statement he was confronted with Captain Campbell, on the said 10th of December, in the presence of the then first Lieutenant, C. H. Watson, and Haire, the pilot, when Captain Campbell could not contradict the facts; therefore this circumstance is somewhat different; and certainly both the *facts*, as *Captain Campbell calls them*, now become *disputable*; particularly as it was not the wish of every member of the mess for Mr. Mant to quit it, but of a partial occurrence, of which he now furnishes a proof, by inserting the following declaration, legally authenticated, of an officer of the *Unité*, who did and must ever stand high in the opinion of Captain Campbell and others, to this effect, viz. “in regard to your quitting the mess (meaning Mr. Mant), was contrary to my wish; and as to your general character, I have only to say, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that your conduct during the whole time we served together, nearly four years and a half, appeared to be strictly conformable to that of the officer and gentleman;” and Mr. Mant now asks, what officer in the navy would not be obliged to comply with *his Captain’s desire* for the exclusion of a member from his mess, whether *deserving of it or not*?—Again, Mr. Mant asserts, that *Captain Campbell* never did show any disposition to confront him with Jursovich, and always refused him a personal inter-

view with other persons, who had preferred charges against him of a greater magnitude, and never *fully* informed him of the accusations against him, or of the names of his accuser, or ever talked to him about the said Jursovich's charges, till the early part of the year 1809, when near to Malta: and when going to the Commander in Chief, as before said, for an explanation of the circumstances, or ever till this moment, has Captain Campbell showed to Mr. Mant the Declaration of the said Jursovich. —Mr. Mant having now replied to the essential points, stated in Captain Campbell's Declaration, wishes to observe, yet trusts he need not point out to the candid reader, that Captain Campbell has confined himself principally to those charges said to reflect on Mr. Mant's conduct, having, but in a very slight manner, touched on Mr. Mant's "statement of facts," which appeared in a former register, and extracted from his pamphlet, viz. the taking and compromising for neutrals, &c. and procuring a bond as an indemnification for the money received, drawn up in his own diction and writing, &c.; nor has Captain Campbell publicly accounted for the 40,000 Spanish dollars, and the *apparent* giving away of the "four valuable vessels, &c. to a particular person at Trieste" (a circumstance very desirable), as the Document in Captain Campbell's own hand-writing and signature now exists; but this matter appears either to have been most artfully evaded, or it must have ensued from *want of memory*; it must be evidently manifest, that the reason Captain Campbell has endeavoured to render so much injustice towards his character, proceeded chiefly from private motives, and of a mere personal nature, and not as might have been supposed to have originated from a pure desire of protecting the respectability of that service to which he belonged, and for the honour and interest of the officers and crews of those ships, which had been placed under his orders, during the *ever memorable command of the Adriatic squadron*. —Mr. Mant now notices the several accounts contained in Captain Wilson's affidavit, and having made notes of the very matter, at the time, and having also lately referred to them, declares the circumstances of the case to be, as follows, viz.—1st. That Mr. Mant having applied for leave to return to England, in consequence of ill health, was informed by Captain Campbell, of some of the malicious reports now in question, and this at the

latter part of December, 1807, at Malta; on which information, Mr. Mant desired to recall his application, requesting Captain Campbell to use the most prompt measures for procuring an investigation of the business, assuring him at the same time, he would lend Captain Campbell every assistance in his power, for promoting so desirable an object, and this stands in print. —2dly. Mr. Mant, respecting the charge "of Jursovich, &c." declares, that he made answer to Mr. Wilson, by saying, as Captain Campbell had promised him a formal investigation of all these matters, shewing, (as has before been stated,) been already denied "a meeting with some of his accusers, that had preferred charges of a greater magnitude," that he should wait the event of the investigation; but acknowledges to have said, that the fellow was a damned rascal, and that his word was as good as Jursovich's. —Mr. Mant, respecting "to the other conversation" also asserts, that his reply to Mr. Wilson on this circumstance was, that "his conscience was perfectly easy on the subject, but he must decline giving any further answer, 'till the inquiry on his conduct had been instituted, as this was the counsel of a friend, whose advice he had received at Malta." —And finally, as to Mr. Mant's not expressing any compunction, (of the "999th part of a thousandth) of his share of the supposed illegal proceedings, says, it is scarcely worth speaking about, but it is notorious, and has been for several years, *that he did refuse to continue the agency*, and such has been likewise, a considerable time in print in this country. —Mr. Mant having now also replied to the principal accounts contained in Captain Wilson's affidavit, observes, that Captain Wilson must have made those assertions, just alluded to, from inferences in his own mind, drawn from the conversation that passed between them, particularly as Mr. Mant's explanation, as said before, has been transcribed from notes made at the time, Mr. Mant therefore cannot allow to go forth to the world, what his own words will not, or cannot warrant, and further in order that the public may not remain uninformed of the full cause, that prevented his speaking about the particulars of Captain Wilson's affidavit. Mr. Mant now publishes the following, viz.—That immediately at the period, to which Captain Wilson alludes, Mr. Mant was in daily expectation of answering to a public, a full investigation of all these matters, in consequence of some calumnious

reports, which were at that moment in general circulation, documents of which, Captain Campbell had said he held, and had promised to bring forward. Mr. Mant therefore considered, that any conversation whatever, on a subject, whereon a formal trial was pending, and especially *with a party interested*, would not only be highly improper, but it might experience an unjust representation, and at any rate it would have been a "supreme act of folly," well knowing the powerful effects of prejudice, which was then in existence, (and since so prevalent in other quarters,) and of so forcible a nature, as not to suffer even real "*truth a fair chance of success*;" and this was also the counsel of his friend at Malta, a major in the army; and in consequence, Mr. Mant avoided giving the then required explanation of Captain Wilson; and Mr. Mant now submits *this declaration* of the several accounts, likewise *to a comparison* with those of the two Captains, and states in regard to his *own veracity*, that he has a full authority from numerous friends, and of the greatest respectability, to publish, that *his veracity stands unimpeached*, and which at any rate, has been ever considered as *equal* to that of either Captain Campbell or Wilson; and it ought to be remembered, that the channel through which Captain Campbell, &c. has always received these reports, &c. said to reflect on Mr. Mant's conduct, have been obtained, chiefly, by the means of the said Haire, or his associates. Men whose characters were such, as few persons would have listened to. Mr. Mant lastly observes, that as he has been very recently informed, that Captain Campbell does not intend to enter into any defence on the charges made against himself, and Mr. Mant being fully convinced his *affidavit*, as inserted in the Register of the 19th ult. *remains uncontroverted*, declines troubling the public further with this controversy, at least by this mode of conveying his sentiments, yet trusts his readers will do him the justice, if not already too much satiated, with the recollection of the *base attempts*, that has been so *invidiously*, but so *unsuccessfully* aimed at his *reputation*, to read with leisure and attention the *whole* contents of his pamphlet, and candidly bear in their minds, the *substance* of the paragraphs contained in the pages, 42 and three following, together with those of 55, 56, and 57, of the same publication—and which may be had gratis at Southampton.

THOMAS MANT.

Southampton, March 7th, 1814.

THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON AND HIS ARMY.

Contrary to general expectation, nothing *decisive* has lately transpired respecting the operations of the contending armies, though some circumstances have occurred which justify the view I have taken of the operations of the campaign, and the more than probable result of the contest. The last official accounts from the French headquarters were dated Troyes, the 26th ult. which city was evacuated by the Austrians on the night of the 23d, and next day occupied by the French. It appears that Buonaparte, previous to this, had, with such admirable skill and promptitude, brought forward the great mass of his troops, that Troyes was actually invested, and the greater part of Prince Schwarzenburgh's army in danger of falling into his hands. At this critical moment "a Russian Aide-de-Camp came to the advanced posts to demand time to evacuate the city, *otherwise it would be burnt*." What a trying circumstance for a mind like Bonaparte's. He had almost the whole of the Austrian army in his power; they were in fact encompassed as if they had been caught in a net. What a triumph it would have been to his ambition, had he availed himself of the opportunity which this afforded of annihilating, by one blow, the flower of an army which had threatened to dictate terms to him in his own capital! Had he been that blood-thirsty, that sanguinary tyrant which his enemies represent him to be; had he been as regardless of the comforts and happiness of his subjects as we are told he is; and had he, as is said, been a total stranger to the feelings of humanity, he would not have hesitated one moment in attacking Troyes, notwithstanding the threat of burning it held out by a *Russian General*, and that the place contained about 60,000 inhabitants, and ranked as one of the principal cities in the empire. But no, Bonaparte is *not* the tyrant he is held out to be; he is not the sanguinary unfeeling wretch that could sacrifice so many interests even for the *glory*, great as it was, which was within his reach. He had done enough for glory; but he felt that he never could do too much for humanity. "This consideration arrested the movements of the Emperor:" Troyes was saved; and the Austrian army, which had frequently before been in the power of the conqueror, experienced, on this occasion, a singular mark of his forbearance and moderation.—What a contrast does the conduct of the French Emperor, in this instance, present to that of those who ordered the burning of Moscow?

This, however, is a contrast upon which, I feel, I cannot enter. It may one day or another "point a moral or adorn a tale;" but, in the present fettered state of the British press, any attempt of this nature, I am fully aware, would be dangerous in the extreme. But though I am sufficiently alive to this degraded state of what is called a free press, I cannot allow myself to pass by unnoticed, the reception which the inhabitants of Troyes gave to Napoleon when he entered their city, not as a haughty conqueror, exulting over ruins and devastation, caused by his inordinate ambition; but having obtained a greater victory, a victory over himself, which must ever endear him to his subjects, and to all good men.— "The Emperor (say the Paris papers) has gratified all our wishes, by passing three days in his good city of Troyes. The house which he inhabited was constantly surrounded by an immense crowd, who always entertained the hope of seeing his Majesty; but during these three days the Emperor did not stir out once. On the 27th, at midnight, his Majesty, surrounded by his brave guards, took the road to Arcis. The people pressed around him in passing. The air resounded with cries of *Vive l'Empereur*. The same enthusiasm was excited by the presence of his Majesty, when he entered our walls victorious; all thought they could not testify too much gratitude; and, in fact, the details with which we have been made acquainted, could not fail to add to our love of the Sovereign. The French army had arrived in a suburb about three in the afternoon; it could have entered the city with the fugitives, but the Emperor chose rather to suspend the march of the troops than to expose our city to the flames, with which it was threatened by an enemy enraged at having been vanquished.—His Majesty passed the night at a miserable hamlet, and it was not till eight in the morning that he made his entrance into our city. The circumstances of that happy day will never be effaced from our memory. Every body approached the Emperor, spoke to him, pressed his hand, thanked him with tears. His Majesty seemed affected, and saw in these marks of attachment the joy of children on the return of a cherished father."—It is unnecessary for me to add any thing to a description so affecting. After the Austrians were allowed to evacuate Troyes, they proceeded to Bar-Sur, a retreat of nearly 20 miles from their position at Troyes. While Bonaparté was thus proceeding in his victorious career, several

stand of colours taken from the combined armies arrived at Paris, and were presented to the Empress by the Minister of War, who, on that occasion, delivered the following impressive speech:—"Madam,—New orders from the Emperor lead me to your Majesty's feet, to lay there new trophies taken from the enemies of France.—At the time when the Saracens were defeated by Charles Martel, in the plains of Tours and Poitiers, the capital was adorned but with the spoils of a single nation. This day, Madam, when dangers equal to those with which France was then menaced have given rise to successes more important, and which were more difficult to obtain, your august Spouse offers you standards taken from the three great powers of Europe.—Since a blind hatred has raised up against us so many nations, even those which France has restored to independence, and for whom she has made such great sacrifices, may we not say that these standards are taken from all Europe?—When our enemies, listening only to the suggestion of revenge, in contempt of the ordinary rules of war, resolved to penetrate into this empire, leaving behind them the vast chain of fortresses which surrounds it on all sides; when they designed, by a rash manoeuvre, to get possession of the capital, without thinking of the means of effecting their retreat, in the midst of a population whom their conduct has exasperated, how was it possible that they were not stopped in this gigantic enterprise by their knowledge of the genius, of the talents, of the character of the Emperor? In a few days they have learned the falseness of their calculations. The bold and rapid operations which have just baffled their designs, recal to every mind the glorious and memorable campaign in Italy in the year five, and those which succeeded it.—It was against the flower of the troops allied against us, at the battles of Montmirail and Vauchamp, at the combat of Montereau, that the ten standards were taken which I present to your Majesty from the Emperor.—These pledges of French valour presage to us new and greater successes, if the obstinacy of the enemy protracts the war. This noble hope is in the heart of every Frenchman. You share in it, Madam; you who, always confiding in the genius of your august Spouse, in the efforts and the love of the nation, have continued to shew, in all the circumstances of this war, a firmness of mind, and virtues worthy the admiration of Europe and posterity."—It will be seen by the extract given above from

the French papers respecting the reception of Napoleon at Troyes, that, after remaining in that city for three days, he set out to Arcis on the 17th ult. This movement, which carried him nearer to Paris than Troyes, is now explained by the arrival of dispatches from Colonel Lowe, who accompanies Blücher's army. The previous accounts brought by Mr. Robinson informed us, that, in consequence of considerable reinforcements which the Marshal had received, he was then at the head of a new army of about 60,000 men. With this force, and while Bonaparte was pursuing Schwartzberg, Blücher made a rapid movement towards Paris, and reached Meaux on the river Marne, only 25 miles north of that capital. Here he had spread out his troops in various directions, evidently for the purpose of forming a junction with the different reinforcements advancing through Germany. In his advance to Meaux, Blücher encountered a French division under Marmont; and, in a partial affair with these troops, he was slightly wounded. The intelligence of the progress of Blücher immediately drew Bonaparte from Troyes, where he left 45,000 men to watch the motions of Schwartzberg, while he proceeded with the main body of his army towards Meaux. Very important intelligence may, therefore, be soon expected from that quarter, as Bonaparte, occupied as he is with two separate armies, must bring one of them into *immediate* action, in order to prevent the other from reaching Paris. That this has been attempted by the Austrian general since Napoleon set out from Troyes, is evident from dispatches received from Lord Burghersh up to the 2nd inst.—By these it appears that there had been some hard fighting at Bar-sur-Aube, during which Schwartzberg was wounded, but that these encounters terminated in favour of the Allies, who had in consequence determined again to "advance upon Troyes." It is rather singular, however, that Lord Burghersh has furnished us with no details of the particulars which immediately preceded and accompanied the evacuation of Troyes by the Allies. He speaks of General Wittgenstein having "quitted the positions of Nogent and Pont-sur-Seine." He mentions some *intended* movements upon the road "between Bar-sur-Seine and Chatillon," places considerably in the rear of Troyes, but he nowhere notices the investment of Troyes itself by Napoleon, the threat to burn it if the Austrian army were not

allowed to leave it unmolested, the proposal of an armistice mentioned in the French bulletin, its subsequent occupation by Bonaparte, nor his departure from it on the 27th, to proceed against Marshal Blücher. These were circumstances surely which could not fail to attract his lordship's notice as of some importance, particularly that which respected the armistice, yet none of them are alluded to in his dispatches. This *silence* in the *Gazette* is the more extraordinary that the *official* bulletin, which was issued on the receipt of the dispatches, left no doubt in any one's mind that his lordship had given the details of the above occurrences. In that bulletin, as it appears in the *Courier*, I find the following statement: "Intelligence being received that *Bonaparte was marching with a part of his army on Seizanne to act against Marshal Blücher*, Prince Schwartzberg had ordered an immediate advance upon Troyes. It is understood that *Bonaparte, leaving 45,000 men on the line of Troyes, had marched with the rest of his army against Marshal Blücher.*" If the information communicated in this bulletin was obtained from Lord Burghersh, how came his dispatches to be afterwards published *without* containing any allusion to Bonaparte's "marching to act against Blücher," or, "his leaving 45,000 men on the line of Troyes?" It is *possible* his lordship may have not said anything as to these and the other omissions which I have noticed, though I should think it very extraordinary if this turned out to be the fact. But even then, if these particulars were actually drawn from another source; if they were the substance of dispatches from another accredited agent, I should still think that these dispatches ought to have been published, or some very good reason assigned for keeping them back. Until some such reason is given, I am afraid there are many who will continue to believe, with me, that they are not put in possession of all the information which, in my opinion, the public, who are the principal parties interested, have an undoubted right to expect. With regard to the complexion of the military intelligence contained in our official dispatches, it does not appear to me of sufficient importance to influence the question one way or another, whether the French Emperor will be successful or not in repelling the invasion of the Allied powers? I have distinctly stated it to be my firm persuasion that he will drive them out of France. Nay more, that he will

not agree to an armistice, unless the armies of the Allies retire across the Rhine, and take up the positions they occupied when they issued their famous proclamation at Frankfort. These opinions are founded on a belief that the French people are *unanimous* in favour of the present government; and, finding that sentiment of unanimity prevail, I cannot entertain a doubt that they will be successful in all their endeavours to support Bonaparte.

THE BOURBONS IN FRANCE.—An article lately appeared in a German newspaper, which stated, that the Allies had been applied to by Louis the XVIIIth, for permission to enter France by Basle, and to circulate the Bourbon proclamation; but that this permission had been *refused*. Upon this article, the *Courier* observed, though the Allies might be desirous of seeing the ancient family restored; yet that “they may be *afraid* of encreasing the partisans of Bonaparte by publicly declaring in their favour, or of putting an apparent affront on the French nation, by seeming to choose for it a monarch. The Allies evidently stand on the best possible footing with the French people, and they are *wise not to endanger their ground*. If they were to defeat Bonaparte in a general battle, and to obtain possession of Paris, *then* the friends of the Bourbons would feel confidence in declaring themselves, because they would know they could be protected. *At present they must remain quiet*, or they may be cut off, to the great injury of the cause.” One would have thought, after this *sage* advice to the allied Sovereigns, and to the partisans of the Bourbon race, to remain *quiet* for the present; to avoid every step which might *increase* the friends of Napoleon; to be anxious not to *affront* the French people by seeming to choose a monarch for them; and to be careful not to weaken the hold which the Allies possessed in the affections of that nation. It might have been expected, I say, after giving such *deliberate* advice, that the *Courier* writer would not have been in *great haste* to applaud proceedings which had a tendency to show that his counsel was held *impertinent*, far less that he himself would soon act a part which demonstrated he was conscious, at the time of giving the advice, that it was not only improper, but would not be attended to by either of the parties for whom it was meant. This, in my mind, was the natural conclusion to be

drawn from the premises. But here, as in almost every other case, this prostituted journal has shown its contempt of all principle, all decency, all propriety, and all truth; for *on the very same day*, in which the above remarks appeared, its columns announced, in the form of a *second* edition, accounts of the *entrance of Monsieur into France*, in a way which showed its *entire approbation* of the measure, although Bonaparte had *not* been “*defeated* in a general battle,” and although the Allies had *not* “*obtained possession of Paris*.” The following is the manner in which the above intelligence was announced in the *Courier* of the 9th inst.—“*Second edition—Courier Office, 3 o'clock*.—We have made inquiries at places where the best information might be expected, and have received three copies of the following *letter* from different quarters, which we have no doubt is *genuine*:—*Vesoul, 22d of Feb. 1814*.—We left Basle on Sunday the 19th, and have arrived in Franche Comte. We have been received in *all* the French towns and villages with *acclamations* by the *whole* of the people, and with cries of *Vive le Roi Louis XVIII. Vive les Bourbons*.—The people are *enchanted* with our dear Prince, who has conducted himself with great affability and condescension. The old, the women and the children *kissed* his hands and his cloaths. *Happiness* was painted in every face, and the people were *so touched* with the affability of Monsieur, that *tears of joy* flowed on all sides.—The old said, “we shall die contented, since we have had the good fortune of beholding the return of our ancient Masters, who have *ever lived* in our hearts.”—Others said, “I give you my heart, for the *Monster* has only left me that.” On arriving here, at Vesoul, the *whole* population, about 5000, came out to meet us. They requested we would walk in on foot, that they might behold their Prince.—Gentlemen arrive from all parts, announcing that the peasants of their communes place themselves at their service, and desire to march for their legitimate sovereign.—A person has just arrived from Alsace, requesting powers to raise a legion with the white cockade.—*Every place desires to surrender to Louis XVIII. All France is ready to rise*. If attempts are made to throw difficulties in the way, it will be found that France will liberate herself.—The first day Monsieur entered France, we travelled thirty-three leagues (about seventy-

miles) in the territories of his august ancestors. Had he been an angel from heaven, the people could not have shewn more eagerness and joy at receiving him.—

It is not my intention here to make any remarks upon the above *precious* document, and that for a reason which, I dare say the reader has anticipated—namely, that the intelligence comes in most questionable shape; in the form of a *private letter*, and that even *without* any signature. It is besides dated as far back as the 22nd of February, since which government have had *official* accounts from France so late as the 2nd instant, without one word being said either about the entrance of Louis, or the “enchantment” of “the old women and children,” who are said to have “kissed his hands and his clothes,” and to have shed “tears of joy” on seeing the “dear prince.”

—I have no hesitation, therefore, in saying, that the whole appears to me a most impudent *fabrication* invented for stock jobbing purposes. I shall not be sorry, however, to learn that it has had the effect intended; for if there are people so foolish, so credulous, as to believe such ridiculous lies, they ought to suffer for their folly and credulity.

In No. 3, of the *Register* for the present year, I published at full length, the *proclamation of the Bourbons*, and made some copious remarks upon it by way of answer. As the subject has been again revived, and the number which contained the proclamation and answer is in great request, and all the copies sometime ago disposed of, I intend *republishing* the same in a separate

form, and if leisure permits, to illustrate my observations, by extracts from the *Code Napoléon*.

OCCURRENCES OF THE WAR.—The last French bulletin stated, that a “flag of truce was sent by Prince Schwartzburgh to propose an armistice” to Bonaparte on the 23d ult., while he was at “the little town of Chatres;” and that on the next day “Count Elahaut, Aide-de-Camp of the Emperor Napoleon; Count Ducca, Aide-de-Camp of the Emperor of Austria; Count Schonwaloff, Aide-de-Camp of the Emperor of Russia; and General Rauch, Chief of the Engineer Corps of the King of Prussia, have assembled at Lusigny, in order to treat of the conditions of a suspension of arms.”

—As I have noticed in another part of the *Register*, not a word is said of this important occurrence in the dispatches published in our *Gazette*, though they are said to detail the whole events of the war down to the 2d inst.—Paris papers have arrived to the 6th, but they contain nothing of an *official* nature. A minor paper of the 4th has the following article:—“The latest letters from the head-quarters, received yesterday evening, announce that the different corps of the army are performing grand manœuvres, and that his Majesty continues to enjoy the best health.”—Under the head “The Emperor Napoleon and his Army,” the reader will find the particulars of the different movements of the contending armies, as far as they had transpired when the *Register* was sent to press.

NOTICE.

Some of those Gentlemen, who preserve the *Register* in *Volumes*, having expressed their regret, that the *STATE PAPERS*, and other important *DOCUMENTS* of a public nature, are, in future, to be excluded, and their representations appearing to have great weight in them, it has been determined on to continue the publication of these *Official Papers*; not, however, in the *Weekly Numbers* of the *Register*, but in a compilation, to be published once in 2, 3, or 6 months, as shall hereafter appear to be best adapted

to the purposes in view. It is intended to print these documents in the same type, form, and size of paper with the *Register* itself. The price will, of course, be proportionably lower, because no stamps will be required, as it will be unnecessary to dispatch this part of the work by post. There will be, as at present, an *Index Sheet* to the *Weekly Numbers*, and another *Index* to the *Public Papers*. The latter publication may be taken, to be bound up with the *Weekly Numbers*, or not, at the option of the Reader.